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Abstract
Currently there is limited security offered in the Electronic Data Interchange
(EDI) systems. Due to the growth of global market, Electronic Data Interchange is becoming an important tool for improving business prospects and
hence becoming a target for fraud and misuse of information. This thesis
attempts to provide security enhancements in the EDI systems. A model of
the EDI system, the Direct Store Delivery System is described with security
features added for global use. The model uses a Third Party Service Provider
providing Message Handling Systems for communication between the trading
partners. This thesis describes the security enhancement in the EDI messages
using the UN/EDIFACT standard of formatting the EDI messages with the
inclusion of certificates, digital signatures in the messages without changing
the syntax of the EDI message. Also, a proposal to use X.500 Directory Services standards for global authentication is described along with other network
security services. All these security services are included in the Application
layer of the OSI reference model and are transparent to the user. As a result
of the proposal, the security services can be implemented on a global ba^is as
a step towards an open-edi system.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter gives a brief introduction to the basic issues of network security,
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) and EDI security.

1.1

Introduction

During the 1990s, there has been a significant rise in the commercial use of
computer networks. Their implications and effectiveness in business have been
felt worldwide, allowing organizations to eliminate "... barriers
and time on service
boundaries
government

and co-ordination^^ [48] and "...

of the organization
agencies

to the premises

and others"These

of

geography

reach out beyond

of the customers,

the

suppliers,

telecommunication capabilities

have provided business with increased potential and ease of global trade by
bringing fundamental changes in the organizational procedures. The growing
number of electronic linkages between traders has produced dramatic effects
on the inter-organizational relationships and industry structure.

Industries, as well as government agencies view Electronic Data Interchange

(EDI) as the emerging technology to support this growth. EDI is often viewed
as a way of replacing the traditional paper documents (e.g. purchase order
forms, shipping forms, invoices, financial documents etc.) with electronic ones,
and replacing conventional methods of transmitting such documents (e.g. mail,
telephone, facsimile, courier etc.) with electronic transmissions. EDI, however,
can also replace manual data entry with electronic data entry (by providing
a Universal Product Code) and can also provide a platform for effective business re-engineering. To ensure the inter-operatability between the various EDI
systems, they should be independent of any particular hardware or software.
In addition, the EDI messages should be conveyed in a structured format.
Thus, the primary purpose of EDI, is to provide communication standards
that promote the interchange of common business information to facilitate the
electronic linkages, without human intervention.

EDI systems have been successfully implemented, often involving multiple
business functions (such as shipping and billing), in a number of industries
(such as automobile, insurance, groceries etc.). There are obvious advantages
in implementing EDI in terms of speed, accuracy and flexibility. However, a
major concern embedded in the use of Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) is
the ever greater need to protect the information from misuse. Security and
privacy have become prominent issues in those public and private sectors which
use Electronic Data Interchange. They all rely on communication networks for
communicating sensitive, commercial, financial and personal information. As
the communication networks are not secure, it is therefore necessary to protect
their valuable information-both within the communication networks and within
the information processors connected to the network. If these concerns are not
properly resolved, they threaten to limit the full potential of networking, in

terms of both participation and usefulness.

1.2

Network Security Issues

The use of EDI requires formatting the data in a structured manner and also
requires communication networks for transmitting these EDI messages. The
users of EDI have the same expectations as users of conventional computer
systems.

They expect accurate delivery of messages; protection from loss;

modification or observation of messages; and reliable service. These are the
network equivalents of integrity, secrecy and availability.

However, several

security problems are inherent in the network access and its use.

1.2.1

Problems in Network Security

In today's environment, networking offers the advantage of sharing important
information among the authorized personnel, both inside and outside the organization and cost effectiveness in implementing a network solution. Pfleeger
28] has discussed some reasons for security problems in networks.

Sharing
Due to resources and workload sharing of networks, a greater number of users
have the potential to access networked systems than single computers. Since
the access is afforded for many systems, the access controls for a single system
is inadequate

networked environments.

C o m p l e x i t y of the S y s t e m
A network combines two or more possibly dissimilar operating systems with
mechanisms for interhost connection. Therefore, a network operating system

or control system is likely to be more complex than an operating system for a
single computing system. This complexity deters the certification or confidence
in the security of a network.

M a n y Points of Attack
A single computing system is a self contained unit. Access controls on one
machine preserves the secrecy of its data. However, when a file is stored in
a network host remote from that user, the file may pass through several host
machines to get to the user. The administrator of one machine may enforce
rigorous security policies, but that administrator does not have any control
over the other hosts in a network. Thus the user in a networked system has
to trust the access control mechanisms of all these systems.

U n k n o w n Perimeter in a Network
The expandibility of a network also implies uncertainty about the network
boundary. One host may be a node on two different networks so that the resources on one network are accessible to the users of the other network as well.
Although wide acceptability is an advantage, this unknown and uncontrolled
group of potentially malicious users is a security disadvantage. A similar problem occurs when new hosts are added to a network. Every network node must
be able to react to the presence of new, and possibly untrustworthy hosts.

1.2.2

Network Security

Since more and more information is conveyed through a computer network,
one of the issues concerning security involves protecting information as it is
transmitted through the network. There are three major trends leading to an

urgent reassessment and causing the escalation of concerns in communications
security [20]. These are : • the increasing interconnection of systems and of networks, making any
system potentially accessible to a rapidly growing population of known
and unknown users;
• The increasing use of computer networks for security-sensitive information e.g. EFT, business data interchange, unclassified but sensitive government information and corporate proprietary information; and
• The increasing ease of engineering a network attack, given the ready
availability of increasingly sophisticated technology and the rapidly falling
costs of such technology to a would-be attacker.
There are many potential types of attacks on commercial or unclassified government networks. They include financial frauds, theft of telecommunication
resources, industrial espionage, illicit eavesdropping for financial or political
gain and malicious attacks by intruders. In addition to countering all these
attacks the communication's security needs to protect data against accidental
exposures. The accidental connection of a sensitive communication session to
the wrong address or the accidental failure to properly protect sensitive information may prove as damaging as a successful deliberate attack. As an EDI
system often transmits commercial or financial data through networks, this
information needs to be protected against network security threats in general.
f.

1.3

Need for EDI Security

The growth of EDI started in small closed user groups, where the trading
partners knew and trusted each other. The data being transferred was not

very critical in context (e.g. purchase orders which are not usually subject to
fraudulent use). As organizations began to rise along the EDI learning curve
they began to understand that the real benefits from EDI results from being
able to restructure the existing business processes. EDI provides simplification
and improvement of existing business processes and matches them with those
of the trading partners. As the technology goes towards an open-EDI, where
orders might be accepted from a company with which no trading relationship exists at this time, the security and audit policies must also be upgraded
to match this new technology. Nowadays, EDI is increasingly being used for
financial transactions and greater security is required in a financial transaction.

Electronic security systems such as Automatic Teller Machines (ATMs)
and Society Worldwide for Interbank Financial Transfer (SWIFT) have been
around for some years transferring money to and from banks and providing
basic security services for their operation. However, Cobb [31] identifies two
major differences between the requirements of Electronic Data Interchange and
Electronic Funds Transfer (EFTs):
• Existing EFTs are operated and managed by a single enterprise or by a
clearly defined closed user groups. EDI, on the other hand, involves multiple independent parties, transferring many different types of transactions between each other. The identification and status of the originator
of an EDI transaction will not always be known to the recipient of that
transactit)n.
Most EFTs today are operated on private networks with restricted access. EDI, however, uses store and forward services from multiple service
providers. This means that data will be in escrow^ during some part of
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its transmission, which is outside the direct control of the originator or
recipient.
The aim and scope of this thesis is based on the security issues in the Electronic
Data Interchange involving multiple trading partners connected via a Value
Added Network Service (VAN).

1.4

Aim of the Thesis

EDI transactions can be divided into two distinct generic activities. The primary activity is the creation of a EDI document from internal data.

This

requires in-house interface software to translate the outgoing messages from
(possibly) unstructured, company or application specific formats into the EDI
document translation format, e.g.

ANSI X12, UN/EDIFACT, and placing

the resulting universal documents into an electronic outgoing message with
the proper security headers and trailers inserted in the message format. The
second activity is the transmission of the standardized EDI document to its
recipient. This requires telecommunication software which transmits the now
structured message to its internal/external recipient typically using data communication standards as defined in the OSI Reference Model.

The main aim of this thesis is to provide security enhancements in the existing EDI systems. This includes providing security enhancements in the EDI
messages using, the UN/EDIFACT standards to structure the data and in the
communication networks while transmitting the EDI messages.

The current implementations of telecommunication networks for private
users require an increasing awareness of network security issues.

Within a

single management domain, where all the processing nodes and network links
are under the control of the same administration, security is not such a critical issue. However, when the management association takes place across the
boundary between two separate management domains, and makes use of the
public data networks, security issues should be considered in greater detail.
The proposals to counter network security threats are described using the
X.400 Message Handling Systems and X.500 Directory Services standards.

1.5

Scope of the Thesis

This thesis presents the background on the communication and security aspects of Electronic Data Interchange. It discusses the security threats in EDI
and the need to enhance the security of the present day EDI systems to support the future trend of open-EDI systems. Finally it proposes a model of an
EDI system, the Direct Store Delivery System to incorporate security services
such as authentication; non-repudiation; authorization; delegation and access
control which are necessary to ensure secure and smooth operation of the EDI
system.

In chapter 2, an overview of EDI is presented along with the specific advantages and means of implementing EDI in an organization. Also, Value Added
Network Services (VANS) used to transmit EDI messages in a store and forward manner, are described with their advantages.

In chapter 3, the security issues related to EDI are discussed and evaluation of the threats posed to the EDI system. Some security issues such as
cross-vulnerability; multiplicity of standards and password guessing attacks

are highlighted.

In chapter 4, the X.400 and X.500 secure message handling systems standards are explained. The main security services provided by the standards are
discussed and their use in the proposed model to provide the security enhancement to the EDI system is described.

In chapter 5, the Direct Store Delivery System, a model of the EDI system
is proposed. The model is based on the Just-In-Time (JIT) principle of inventory management.

In chapter 6, the security services provided in an UN/EDIFACT standard
of EDI messages are described along with the security enhancement provided
in the standard. In particular, the inclusion of digital signatures, certificates
for authentication of origin, message integrity in the messages itself without
changing the syntax of the message are discussed.

In chapter 7, the basic security services needed to ensure the smooth operation of the proposed system are described. The authentication protocol
based on the X.509 standards is presented. Other security services such as
user identification; non-repudiation and responsibility are also discussed.

Finally in chapter 8, the solutions given in the proposed model of EDI are
discussed and suggestions for further research work are proposed.

In Appendix A, the paper titled "Direct Store Delivery System" is presented.

Chapter 2
Electronic Data Interchange
System
This chapter presents an overview on Electronic Data Interchange systems.
The basic concepts of Electronic Data Interchange and its advantages are described. In addition, the benefits of using Value Added Network Service in an
EDI system are described for communication between trading partners.

2.1

Basic Elements of Electronic Data Interchange

Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) is the movement of business data electronically within or between firms in a structured, computer processable data format
that permits data to be transferred without rekeying from an application in one
location to an application in another location [23]. In the traditional paperbased flow of information, manual data entry is performed at each step in the
process. In addition, a comparison of purchase orders, receiving of notices and
invoices are also required to be done manually. This contributes to the higher

EDI format service

EDI format service

User format to EDIFACT,

User format to EDIFACT,

X12, etc

X12, etc

Communications Service

Communications Service

Figure 2.1: Basic Elements in EDI
cost of transaction processing and the continued involvement of the end user in
the overall process. These two manual processes are eliminated with the substitution of electronic methods such as EDI. In an EDI system the computer
transfer can be direct, with two companies using an agreed data protocol, or it
can be performed using a third party service provider. Users can communicate
business documents such as purchase orders, price quotes, shipping notices or
even payment orders, electronic funds transfer to customers and suppliers. The
format in EDI is governed by a set of standards. Essentially an EDI system
comprises four basic elements as shown in figure 2.1. These are:

2.1.1

Application to Application Process

EDI is a direct application to application communication as opposed to computer to computer communication.

At the simplest level, one (the sender)

application generates information which is processed by a second (the recipi-

ent) application. An important distinguishing characteristic of EDI systems is
that the two applications are geographically distant. The EDI system requires
the data to be in a highly structured format according to the EDI standards.

2.1.2

Standards

The use of structured, formatted messages based upon internationally agreed
standards are necessary in an EDI because they enable messages to be translated, interpreted and checked for compliance to a standard set of rules. It requires a set of procedures (and protocols) for converting the information from
the native format generated by the sender application into a previously agreed
standardized format (e.g. ANSI X12, EDIFACT, etc.) for interchange. The
recipient application has access to a corresponding set of translation services
which convert the information from the standardized format to the required
native format. Often they are processed in batches, or they can be handled directly in real time. This allows companies to enquire directly on their trading
partner's system (where authorized) for information such as price, availability,
order status etc.

2.1.3

Translation Software

The EDI translational software links the application and the communications
software and makes the EDI process functional. This software allows for the
translation of data from a company's internal format to the industry specific
format. EDI translation software has two primary functions. For outgoing
data, the software reformats the electronic data into the public or industry
standard used by the receiving partner. For incoming data, the software reformats the EDI data into the format required by the internal application

and performs edit checks.

EDI translation software typically consists of a

communication link and an application interface. The communications

link is

responsible for sending and receiving teleprocessing commands along the network that connects the trading partners and the third party service providers.
The application interface controls the sending and receiving of EDI messages,
or transactions, to and from the document database.

2.1.4

Communication Networks

The telecommunications hardware and software are the components that create the link between the trading partners and provide the partners with the
capability to send and receive EDI transaction sets.

The use of electronic

mailboxes for "store and collect/store and forward" transmission/delivery of
documents is provided by the third party network service provider. Thus it
requires a set of procedures (and protocols) for packaging the information generated by the previous (information format conversion) phase into the format
required by the communication network service used to transport the information between the communicating applications. Telecommunication software
controls the actual transmission of EDI messages. Features of this software can
include automatic dialing, management and maintenance of trading partners
addresses and activity logging.

The aims of EDI will only be realized if the EDI systems incorporate appropriate communication mechanisms. The requirements for such communication
systems include:
• The communication should be independent of machine, media and the
end system allowing trading partners to operate within their own computing strategies without being restricted by the EDI systems;

• The communication system does not affect existing data processing applications;
• The EDI messages should not be affected by the use of a particular
communications protocol;
• The communication must handle messages of the format used by EDI, or
that of a general purpose communication system which can handle any
format of the message being used;
• The communication must provide services that are required by the processes that are inter-working to provide EDI. These services include definitions of what happens if the EDI message cannot be delivered.
Thus the term Electronic Data Interchange does not refer to:
• Electronic mail: Like Electronic Data Interchange, electronic mail also
moves business data electronically, but generally uses a free rather than a
structured format. Since the sender may choose any format, it is difficult
to design an apphcation program that would directly accept electronic
mail input without significant manual editing.
• Facsimile Transmission : Facsimile transmission represents the transfer
of totally unstructured data.

Data in almost any format, from pho-

tographs to purchase orders, may be sent by this means. In facsimile
transmission, a digitized image is formed of the message and the image
is transrnitted to the receiver. The receiver of the facsimile transmission
would not be able to enter the image directly into a business application without manually keying in the printed image or at best editing the
character file by some means.

• File Transfer : This application also makes little use of standard formats
which need not have any connection with applications at either end of
transmission.
In the next section the benefits offered by the use of Electronic Data Interchange in an organization are examined.

2.2

Benefits of EDI

The use of EDI is increasing on a global scale. The efficiency and cost-saving
aspects of EDI form a strong basis for its growing popularity in the world
of electronic transactions. Major organizations have been at the forefront of
EDI, and smaller entities are aligning themselves along the "paperless" path of
business transaction and communication. Although the case for an EDI differ
between companies, several key reasons such as improved customer service;
reduced operating costs and responsiveness to market demands continually
re-occur. The key benefits which result from the employment of EDI in an
organization include : -

2.2.1

Improved Productivity

There is improved productivity using EDI with the reduction in paper flow and
support for just-in-time inventories.

The benefits normally associated with

the reduction in paper work in an EDI environment include personnel savings,
better data quality and improved customer service. In addition, savings may
be attributed to the reduction or elimination of data entry requirements. The
electronic transfer of business documents improves data quality by minimizing
potential misinterpretation resulting in an error in data quality. EDI improves

customer service by compressing the inherent time delays in the value added
chain, thus greatly reducing the possibility of lost or missing information.

2.2.2

Competitive Advantage

In a highly competitive market, the ability to offer significant cuts in product
delivery time may be the difference between winning and losing a contract.
This is particularly relevant to international trade, where the movement of
paperwork can lag behind the associated movement of goods, resulting in goods
being tied up in port waiting for clearance. The net effect is increased cost to
the carrier, which filters through into increased cost to the customer.

2.2.3

Reduced Financial Exposure

With the use of EDI, the financial exposure risks are reduced thereby making cash management more efficient. Commercial risks may be contained by
developing fewer but stronger supplier relationships. When the barriers to
inter-organizational communication are greatly reduced, the quality of the relationship should improve. EDI enables suppliers to send accurate and timely
invoices. Customers report vast improvements in matching invoices with purchase orders and deliveries, and a reduction in the number of errors and queries.
The net result is that a high proportion of invoices are on time.

2.3

Who Should Use EDI ?

The use of EDI is steadily growing across all industries. One of the driving
forces behind the implementation of EDI is the external pressure from customers. Companies fear losing their business advantage if they do not implement EDI in their organization. The potential organizations that may require

to implement EDI include those who
• Handle large volumes of repetitive standard transactions which is an
important factor in transportation and groceries industries.
• Operate on a very tight margin.
• Face stiff competition, requiring significant productivity improvements.
• Operate on a time-sensitive environment.
• Have received requests to convert to EDI from trading partners.

2.4

Implementing EDI

Pugsley [44] has defined six steps to successfully implement EDI technology in
an organization:
• Complete understanding of EDI : The depth of knowledge a company
acquires on EDI depends on the internal efforts spent. If no external
consultants are hired then the level of knowledge should be high. One
method to gain knowledge is to join one of the groups developing standards. (e.g. EDI Council of Australia)
• Agreed on standards with business partners : After finding a suitable business partner, agreements should be made concerning standards, transactions to be exchanged, message syntax, file transfer protocol etc.
• Modifying existing systems : The host computer applications should be
modified so that EDI information is incorporated or integrated directly
into the applications. Good EDI software should provide an application
interface to many different applications.

• Translate data : Various translation modules are required to translate
transactions into EDI messages according to the EDI standard being
used. The translation is required of the data into the EDI format as well
as translation of data from an EDI package into a format compatible
with the in-house application.
• Prepare communications : A network connection to various trading partners is required via either a Value Added Network (VAN) or direct connection.
• Management

and audit of the whole process : Consistent management

and auditing of the entire process must be established and maintained.
The tasks include archiving transactions, inspecting error logs and ensuring security of the system.
Direct computer-to-computer communications with a trading partner requires
that both firms use similar communication protocols; have the same transmission speed; have telephone lines available at the same time and have compatible
computer hardware. If these conditions are not met, communication becomes
difficult, if not impossible. A Value- Added Network (VAN) can solve these
problems by providing services that enhance the basic telecommunication network.

2.5

Value Added Network (VAN)
f-

A VAN, at the simplest level, provides point-to-point packet switching. At a
more advanced level it may also offer protocol conversion to support a wide
range of different equipment. A comprehensive VAN is likely to have the following general components - basic network, generic services, transaction relay,

application enabling, information databases and network management. It will
also provide a two-way link that enables users to rapidly exchange records
or specific fields of an EDI message rather than the whole message, but it is
more commonly used as a store and forward service that employs electronic
mailboxes to which messages are sent. By using VAN services, a company
can trade electronically with many trading partners and yet only need to meet
one set of EDI communications requirements - those determined by the user's
chosen VAN.

T h e commonly available VAN service providers are GEIS EDI exchanges,
IBM's Information Exchange EDI Service, British Telecom's EDI*Net service.

2.5.1

Benefits of VAN

Generally trading partners do not operate in the same computer environment
nor use the same data format. VANs put order into this EDI world by performing conversions between diff"erent trading partner environments, thus enabling
many trading partners to work as a single user community. T h e additional
benefits obtained in using a VAN are:
• A direct communication link to any trading partner
• VAN service providers' experience and knowledge of the existing EDI
standards and evolving EDI technologies;
• A v a n ' S ability to support multiple data format standards;
• VAN mailbox services, a store and forward system of messaging;
• 24 hour services; and

• VAN'S ability to provide tracking and control information, with which
users audit document and message transmission between partners.

2.6

Existing Third Party Service Providers

There are number of Third Party Service Providers available which offer value
added services to the customers. The basic security service provided is through
the use of passwords.

In Trada-Net, there is high physical security.

Access to the system is

through passwords which are changed daily. However, the messages can only
be sent through the service after prior agreement of both the trading partners
for exchange of particular data type. There are audit trails for the complete
transactions and the third party also offers facility of doing trading defined in
a closed user group.

T h e world's largest EDI third party service provider is GEIS. It provides
physical safeguards to the incoming lines. In addition, distribution to different
lines is done via two levels of random access devices before the messages are
routed out to the leased lines (i.e. message bit stream is also split). It also
provides added security functions such as an option for a secondary password
and requirement of session code when transferring funds.

2.7

Summary

This chapter outlined the basic concepts of an EDI, its advantages and the
benefits to improving business relationships.

Since EDI involves paperless

transactions, there is greater need to prove that the transactions are authentic
and they must be protected against misuse and fraud. In the next chapter the
security threats that are inherent in an EDI system are discussed.

Chapter 3
Security Issues in EDI
A threat is a circumstance, condition or event with the potential
to cause harm to personnel and/or network resources in the form
of destruction, disclosure, modification of data, denial of service,
and/or fraud, waste and abuse. [25 .
Due to the basic nature of paperless transactions in Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), the security of an EDI system should be studied in greater
detail. This chapter addresses the security threats inherent in the present day
EDI systems such as password guessing attacks, cross-vulnerability, multiplicity of standards along with the threats encountered in distributed systems.

3.1

Basic Concepts

As mentioned ."in the previous chapter, EDI is becoming an accepted business
technology for participating in today's global market. However, this technology cannot be implemented in a risk free environment. Users must be assured
that full consideration has been given to the security issues inherent in the
use of computers and telecommunications in accomplishing traditional paper-

based activities. Such processes have been targets of fraud and other criminal
threats. Most companies beheve that the current EDI agreements and third
party service providers offer adequate security against fraud and errors in EDI
transactions. This is far from true. There is a definite need to upgrade the
existing security as the complexity of EDI communities grow [18].

The concept of data security developed long before computers. For example, cheques are usually written with the background patterns to detect manual
alteration, while watermarks and other hidden image graphics are used to deter the use of photocopies. The difference between security for paper cheques
and security for electronic transactions lies in the ways in which fraud can occur. In electronic transactions fraud can occur through access to unprotected
data terminals or electronic files or through interception of data as it is being
transmitted. There are several transmission link types which can be chosen by
a network - wired cables, terrestrial microwave, communication satellites and
optical fibers. Different tapping risks exist and different methods are available
for tapping of each type of link [28]. Commercial network suppliers such as
INS, ISTEL and IBM have built exhaustive security systems into their networks to deter unauthorized entry into the system, although this does not
guard against the possibility of detectionless methods of tapping such as interception of microwave transmission or wiretapping.

The level of security sought must be consistent with factors such as: perceived threats to the system; perceived value of the information contained in
the system and the internal and legal requirements (i.e. audit trails) of an
organization. The implemented countermeasures must be balanced between
the perceived threats, economics, ease of use and maintenance of the system.

Keeping these factors in view, the following security issues need to be countered to ensure the smooth and secure operation of an EDI system.

3.2

E D I Security Issues

For the EDI to be widely accepted in commercial trading, users must be assured
that the electronic system provides them with the equivalent protection against
mistakes, misinterpretation and fraudulent activities that is offered by the
paper and signature system to which they are accustomed.

The following

security issues related to EDI are discussed in view of the security offered in
the present day systems.

3.2.1

Password Guessing Attacks

Most of the present day systems rely on passwords to gain access but, passwords are easy to guess and this makes the system vulnerable to password
guessing attacks.

Users are very poor in choosing good passwords.

An in-

truder can capture a quantity X that is derived from a password in a known
way. Then the intruder can use an arbitrate amount of computing power to
guess passwords, convert them in a known way and see if X is produced. The
best source of selecting such passwords is the dictionary and hence it is also
called as dictionary

attack,

e.g. In Kerberos Authentication System [29, 34],

when the usee requests the ticket granting ticket {Tc,tgs), the answer is returned encrypted with Kc, a key derived by a publicly-known algorithm from
the user's password. A guess at the user's password can be confirmed by calculating Kc and using it to decrypt the recorded answer. An intruder, who
has recorded many such login dialogs, has good odds of finding several new

passwords.

3.2.2

Cross Vulnerability

Generally EDI systems work on a point to point basis or have a limited number
of trading partners. The security and control features incorporated in the system are as strong as the weakest link in the EDI chain. A potential exposure or
cross-vulnerability due to technical limitation in one EDI system can compromise the integrity of the other dependent EDI systems. Cross-vulnerabilities
exist between systems that rely on common values for user identification and
authentication, such as IDs and passwords.

3.2.3

Multiple Standards

Trading partners usually work on a variety of standards such as UN/EDIFACT,
ANSI X12, O D E T T E etc.

Problems arise when the two trading partners

adhere to different standards.

The security features offered in a particular

standard may not be comparable to the other standard.

3.2.4

Authentication

The extensive use of open networks and distributed systems poses serious
threats to the security of end-to-end communications and network components themselves. A necessary foundation for securing a network is the ability
to reliably authenticate communication partners and other network entities.
Authentication is the most important of the security services, because all other
security services depend upon it. Authentication relates to a scenario where a
claimant has presented a principal's identity and claims to be that principal.
Authentication enables a verifier to verify the identity of the principal.

3.2.5

Non-Repudiation

In EDI, non-repudiation services provide a communication user with protection
against another user who later denies that some communication exchange took
place. While these services do not prevent a user from repudiating another
user's claim that something occurred, they provide evidence to resolve any
such disagreement. In general, the evidence must be proved convincingly to the
third party arbitrator. In data networking environments, repudiation scenarios
can be separated into two distinct cases:
• Repudiation of origin : There is disagreement as to whether a particular
party originated a particular data item.
• Repudiation of delivery : There is disagreement as to whether a particular
item was delivered to a receiving party.

3.2.6

Disclosure of Information

With the introduction and use of EDI, additional security risks arise apart
from those which exist for the conventional electronic information systems.
The computers of a trading partner can initiate transactions inside another
partner's accounting systems which are processed in a totally automatic environment. By its very nature, EDI requires that the system be continuously
open to receive incoming transactions. This means that the system and the
associated data are exposed continuously to attack and possible compromise.
An EDI trading agreement is done for the exchange of data among geographically dispersed participants. Consequently this mechanism is exposed to all
threats to which the telecommunication system is subjected.

Therefore all

data protection requirements for a distributed telecommunication process are

applicable to an EDI trading agreements.

3.2.7

Lack of Hard Copy

With EDI, the information concerning predetermined subject matter that
could be conveyed on paper is transferred as a set of electronic messages in
standardized formats. The information may remain in electronic form and
may never be printed. The lack of hard copy records and manual signatures
creates new risks that must be carefully considered in any EDI implementation. As a result, original hard-copy evidence of obligation or commitment by
the trading partners may not be available. Instead, electronic records must
be used. Specific activities must be undertaken to assure that EDI messages,
such as electronic records, are authentic, properly authorized and completely
and accurately retained with audit trails for purposes of accountability.

3.2.8

Other Issues

In order to accommodate the increased need of the user community, as the
complexity of an EDI system grows, the security services also need to be upgraded. In addition, there are various network security threats that need to
be countered in an EDI system. They include eavesdropping, denial of service,
packet replay and packet modification.

Eavesdropping
Eavesdropping allows an intruder to make a complete transcript of network
activity. As a result, the intruder can obtain sensitive information, such as
passwords, data, and procedures for performing functions. An intruder can

gain information by wire tapping, eavesdropping by radio or eavesdropping
via auxiliary ports on terminals. In today's competitive world, disclosure of
information about a company may prove fatal for the future of the company.

Denial of Service
Multi-user, multi-tasking operating systems are subject to denial of service
attacks where one user can render the system unusable for legitimate users by
damaging or destroying resources so that they cannot be used. They may be
caused accidentally or deliberately. It will help to prevent intentional denial
of service attacks if precautions are taken to prevent unintentional denial of
service attacks.

Systems on a network are vulnerable to overload and destructive attacks
as well as other types of intentional or unintentional denial of service attacks.
Three common forms of network denial of service attacks are service overloading, message flooding and signal grounding.

In service overloading, the

intruder generates spurious messages to increase the traffic in the network
thereby degrading the service to the user. In message flooding, the intruder
generates confusing routing messages or simply flood the network with enough
garbage data to saturate the links. This may make the network inoperative.
An active intruder can disrupt the service or ground the signals by intercepting or destroying messages for a particular user. It is important for system
administrators, to protect against denial of service threats in an EDI system
without denying access to legitimate users.

Packet Replay
Packet replay refers to the recording and the re-transmission of message packets
in the network. Packet replay is a significant threat for an EDI System because
an intruder could replay legitimate authentication sequence messages to gain
access to an EDI system. Packet replay is frequently undetectable, but can be
prevented by using packet time-stamping and packet sequence counting.

Packet Modification
Packet modification is a significant integrity threat which involves one system
intercepting and modifying a packet destined for another system. In many
cases, packet information may not only be modified, but may also be destroyed.

3.3

Risk Analysis

To counter the above mentioned threats effectively, a risk analysis should be
performed by the systems staff at the initiation of an EDI project. The risk
analysis should focus on the these potential risks:
• Authorized personnel can initiate unauthorized or erroneous transactions
that could result in excessive costs, fraud, embarrassment, or legal exposure.
• Unauthorized users can gain access to EDI applications and initiate
unauthorized transactions or destroy data.
• Data can be lost, inaccurately transmitted, or altered during transmission.
• The EDI application does not meet business objectives or satisfy either
user or control requirements.

• Adequate audit trails are not maintained, impairing the organization's
ability to evaluate controls or potentially exposing it to legal liability.
• As a result of control weaknesses, the organization is exposed to the
environment of trading partners.
• The trading partner agreement does not adequately address liabilities for
protection of proprietary data, the required components to constitute a
binding agreement or other necessary clauses.
• Formal contracts with third party EDI service providers do not adequately address security, system reliability and availability, or responsibilities.

3.4

Summary

This chapter described the security threats in an EDI system.

In chapter

5,6 and 7, the Direct Store Delivery System^ a model of an EDI system which
provides the security services for user identification, global authentication, user
authorization and non-repudiation services is described.

Chapter 4
Standards for Secure Message
Handling
This chapter describes the X.400, X.500 standards for secure message handling.
In particular, those security services offered in these standards which can be
used on a global basis in a networked environment are examined.

4.1

X.400 Overview

The X.400 Message Handling System is a form of store and forward type of
message transfer, including transfer of electronic business data interchange
and voice messaging. The standards provide security services for end-to-end
security. A more detailed description is available in the literature [15, 16, 18 .
In this section, three main aspects of the MHS are described, the functional
model, the message structure and delivery reporting from the security point of
view.

Message Handling System

Message Transfer System
MTA

AU

MTA

MTA

UA

MHS User

MTA

MS

UA

MHS User

Figure 4.1: Message Handling System

4.1.1

Functional Model

A functional model [25] is shown in the figure 4.1. The MHS is a collection of
MTAs (Message Transfer Agents), MSs (Message Stores), UAs (User Agents)
and AUs (Access Units). MTAs perform the store-and-forward message transfer function. MSs provide storage for messages. UAs enable users to access the
MHS and AUs provide links to other communication systems. MTAs comprise
of MTS (Message Transfer System), the principal component of the MHS. A
message is submitted to an MTA by an originating UA, MS or AU, transferred
to the recipient MTA(s) and deUvered to one or more recipient UAs, MSs or
AUs. If the message is addressed to multiple recipients, the appropriate MTAs
perform any splitting (i.e. replicating) of the message needed for delivery to
each recipient.

Messages are transferred between MTAs on a cooperating store-and-forward
basis. Since no end-to-end association is required, the MTA serving the message recipient need not be active when the message leaves the originating MTA.
The message may be stored at an intermediate MTA until the recipient MTA
becomes operational.

MTAs transfer messages whose content may be encoded in any format.
MTAs neither examine nor modify the content of messages except when they
are performing conversion. Conversion increases the effectiveness of the MHS
by allowing users to submit messages in one encoded format (e.g. telex) and
have them delivered in another encoded format. A UA can register with the
MTA the encoded information types that may be delivered, and request the
MTA to perform any required conversions.

The UA is the MHS component that enables a user to access the MHS, for
both the origination and reception of messages. When submitting messages,
the UA supplies to an MTA, either directly or indirectly via an MS, the message content, the address(es) of the message recipient(s) and the MTS services
being requested. The message content is the information that the originator wants transferred to the message recipient(s). The addresses and service
request data are used by the MTS to deliver the message. When receiving
messages, the JQA may accept delivery of messages directly from an MTA, or
it may employ an MS to accept delivery of messages and retrieve them from
the MHS at a later time.

The MS is an optional MHS component that acts as an intermediary be-

tween a UA and MTA. The MS often resides with the MTA serving it. The
primary purpose of the MS is to provide a repository for the delivery of messages. The UA can retrieve messages from this repository. By using an MS to
accept delivery of messages, a UA is not required to be constantly available.
This is especially useful for UA applications implemented on a PC. The MS
may also submit and forward messages on behalf of the UA, and notify the
UA at the time of message delivery.

The AU is the MHS component that provides a gateway between the MHS
and another communications system. Another AU, the PDAU (Physical Delivery Access Unit) enables MHS users to send messages to users residing on
a physical delivery system such as an EDI mailbox.

4.1.2

Message Structure

The message structure consists of a message envelope and a message content.
The envelope represents the information required by the MTS to deliver the
message, such as the address of the recipient and any special handling instructions. Many X.400 security parameters are transferred on the message
envelope. The message content represents the information that the originator
wants conveyed to the message recipient.

4.1.3

Delivery Reporting

The basic X.400 messaging service provides notification of message non-delivery.
When a message cannot be delivered to a recipient, a non-delivery report is
generated and returned to the originator. The content of the non-delivery report contains the status information about the subject message. The MTA

also provides notification of delivery as an optional service. If the message
originator requests acknowledgment of successful delivery, a delivery report is
returned to the originator by the recipient's MTA upon delivery of the subject
message.

4.2

Security Related Data Structures

The security label and the token are used to convey security related information between communicating parties. This section defines only the principal
attributes comprising the structures.

4.2.1

Security Label

A security label is a collection of attributes associated with an MHS message
or entity which permits its classification in terms of a security level. The security label attributes include:
A security policy identifier which identifies the security policy with which
the security label is associated,
A printable privacy mark which identifies the level of privacy to be afforded
in a message or report,
A security classification which classifies a message or report for security
purposes,
A set of security categories which restricts the context of the privacy mark,
the security classification, or both. The categories are application-defined, and
may include codewords to the privacy mark or security classification.
Security labels may be transferred in MHS messages and reports, conveyed
during the association establishment between the two entities (e.g. A UA may

:

transfer security labels when connecting to its MTA), or registered with MHS
entities (e.g. an MTA may maintain a registry of security labels for its users).

4.2.2

Token

The token is a signed data structure used to convey security-related information from an originator to a single recipient. It consists of a series of data fields
with the digital signature appended. The general form of a token is:
A{sgnAlg,

B, sgnData, encAlg, Bp[encData]

}

where A is the name of the originator of the token, sgnAlg identifies the algorithm used by the originator to compute the signature, t^ is a time stamp, B is
the name of the intended recipient, Bp[encData] is the data encData encrypted
under the public key of B i.e. Bp, encAlg identifies the asymmetric algorithm
used to perform this encryption, and sgnData and encData are collections of
security related parameters. The contents of the sgnData and encData depend
on the security services being provided. The attributes comprising the token
include:
• the name of the recipient
• the date and time the token was generated
• a collection of additional fields that is signed (signed-data):
-

a content confidentiality algorithm identifier,

-

a content interity check,

-

a message security label,

-

a request for proof of delivery,

-

a message sequence number,

-

a nonce

• a collection of data fields that is encrypted (encrypted-data):
— a symmetric key used to encrypt the content,
— a symmetric key used to compute a content integrity check,
— a content integrity check,
— a message security label,
— a message sequence number.
The attributes of the token are protected by the digital signature of the originator.

The token provides three forms of cryptographic protection.

First,

it ensures that only the recipient can view the plaintext information in the
encrypted-data.

Second, it ensures that the token has not been modified.

Third, it authenticates the identity of the token originator.

4.3

X.400 Security Limitations

The basic security services provided by the X.400 standards include: message
security

labeling, secure access management,

origin authentication,

tegrity, data confidentiality, non-repudiation and security

data in-

management.

One security limitation is that the data in the token is encrypted before it
is signed. This is considered to be a poor practice because the recipient can authenticate the encrypted data, not the plaintext data. In a worst case scenario,
a malicious party can intercept a message, and create a new message keeping
the encrypted content of the original message, but generating a new message
token. The new token would be signed by the malicious party. Under these

circumstances, the message recipient could could be fooled into believing that
the malicious party originated the message. This can be avoided depending
on how the security services are implemented. For instance, defining a token
so that the encryption is performed after the signature is calculated, removes
the limitations but at the cost of some increase in processing.

A second limitation pertains to the MS (Message Store). An MS can accept
the delivery of messages on behalf of a UA. If a message originator requests
proof of delivery for a message whose content is encrypted, and the message
is delivered to an MS, the MS would require access to the encryption key to
provide the service. This would involve providing the MS with the recipient's
private key to decrypt the message and perform verification, or providing a
shared key between the recipient and the originator. Neither case is desirable
from a security standpoint. This is one scenario where a recipient (i.e. the
Message Store) might ignore the originator's request for proof of delivery.

A final limitation pertains to the MTS services which access the message
content or message recipient. An MTA may perform conversion on incoming
messages. Any type of conversion invalidates integrity checks. Also, if the content is encrypted, the conversion cannot be performed without the MTA first
decrypting the content. To decrypt the content, the MTA would access the
encryption key, which is not desirable from the security point of view. Similar
problems result from services that modify the message recipient, such as MTA
expanding a distribution list or redirecting a message. If an MTA performs
such a service on a message where the recipient's public key is used as input
to some security service (e.g. to encrypt the encrypted-data of a token), the
security service must be calculated using the public key of the new recipient.
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Figure 4.2: EDI Message Structure

The communication of EDI messages require that the messages are in structured format before they are transmitted on a network. To facilitate the transmission of structured messages in a message handling system, X.435 or Pedi
standard was developed.

4.4

X.435

EDI interchanges can be conveyed in many ways - directly over a telephone
line or encapsulated in a file transfer.

EDIM Originator
Trusted Functionality

EDIM Originator
Trusted Functionality

EDIMG

EDIMG

User

User

EDI-UA

EDI-UA

EDI-]VIS

EDI-MS
EDIN
EDIM
MTS

Figure 4.3: X.435 Security
T h e basic concept in X.435 standard is that there are special E D I messages
(EDIMs) consisting of a heading and a body part as shown in the figure 4.2
Typically a body part could be an EDIFACT interchange or an ANSI X.12
E D I interchange. The heading contains many fields concerned with identifying
the message and specifying how it is to be handled. An E D I message can be
broken down into several components:
• Data Elements - the smallest indivisible piece of data which is equivalent
to words in the spoken language;
• Segments - a set or group of related data elements;
• Messages - a set or group of segments in the order specified by the
standard. Each message specifies a specific transaction.

Additionally, EDI Notifications (EDINs) exist, specifically to address the problem of confirmation of receipt at the application level (i.e. by the receiving
EDI application) as opposed to simply confirmation of delivery. In figure 4.3,
there is a special EDI-UA together in a trusted environment that accesses the
underlying MTS, with added EDI-MS. EDINs are special messages linked to
the original subject EDIM by appropriate cross references. They contain a
series of common fields followed by positive, negative or forwarded fields, depending on the nature of EDINs. EDIMs and EDINs introduce new security
elements of services, essentially to guarantee the genuineness of EDIN, as valid
confirmation of EDIMs.

4.5

X.500 Directory Services

The objective of the X.500 Directory is to provide a logical global database
for public and private directory services. The Directory is a collection of distributed open systems that cooperate to hold a logical database of information
about a set of objects in the real world. The users of the Directory can read or
modify the information, or parts of it, subject to permission being given. The
access to the Directory is interactive - supporting both browsing and automatic lookup. The application process employs user friendly naming schemes
to achieve this.

A global directory requires co-operation between a large number of network
operators and service providers, each of which administers a range of names
and addresses and maintains its own separate database. There are three kinds
of information held in a directory:
• User information that is intended for use primarily by the people and

systems that access the Directory to obtain data such as electronic mail
address, phone numbers, network address and public key identity certificates.
• Operational information that is intended for use primarily by the Directory system itself. Examples of such systems include access controls and
internal consistency requirements that the Directory must maintain.
• Server information that is used by each server to identify the location
and contents of the other servers.

4.5.1

Functional Organization of Directory

The X.500 Directory Standard identifies two major functional components for
the Directory. These are the Directory User Agent (DUA) and the Directory
System Agent (DSA). The DUA represents a user of the Directory and provides
access to the DSAs that process the actual Directory requests. The Directory
information may be distributed amongst a set of co-operating DSAs to provide
an integrated service called a Distributed Directory. A DSA may also operate
as a free standing single database, referred to as a Centralized Directory. The
overview of the distributed directory is shown in figure 4.4 The information
entries contained in the Directory are referred to as the Directory Information
Base (DIB) which is structured to form a Directory Information Tree (DIT).
The protocols that take place within a directory are Directory Access Protocol
( D A P ) which define the exchange of requests and outcomes between DUA and
DSA; and Directory System Protocol (DSP) which defines the exchange of
requests and outcomes between two DSAs.

Figure 4.4: Distributed Directory

4.5.2

X.509 Directory Authentication Framework

The recommendations define a framework for the provision of authentication
services by the Directory to its users. The recommendations provide two complementary goals:
• distribution of trusted keys and enforcement of access controls to information based on the rights of the requester,
• confidence held in the information held in the Directory provided to
identify that user.
Authentication can only be provided within the context of a defined security
policy. The recommendations provide two types of authentication - simple authentication based on password as a verification of claimed identity and strong
authentication"'employing credentials formed using cryptographic techniques
which will be described in chapter 7.

The Directory recommendations are based on public key cryptosystems. It
is a major advantage of such systems that the user certificates may be held in

a directory database as attributes and may be freely communicated within the
directory systems and obtained by users of the Directory in the same manner
as other directory information. The user certificates are assumed to be formed
by offline means and placed in the Directory by its creator (Certification Authority). When a CA issues a certificate to a user, the certificate binds the
name and the public component of the user. The general structure of the
certificate using the Abstract Syntax Notation (ASN) is:

Certificate := SIGNED { SEQUENCE {
Version

0] Version DEFAULT v l ,

SerialNumber

CertificateSerialNumber,

Signature

Algorithmldentifier,

Issuer

Name,

Validity

Validity,

Subject

Name,

SubjectPublickeylnfo

SubjectPublicKeylnfo,

IssuerUniqueldentifier

1] IMPLICIT Uniqueldentifier OPTIONAL,
- - if present, version must be v2

SubjectUniqueldentifier

[2] IMPLICIT Uniqueldentifier OPTIONAL
- - if present, version must be v2 - - } }

Before users can mutually authenticate, the Directory will supply complete
certification and return certification paths.

4.6

Summary

The MHS (X.400) standards include very comprehensive security facilities.
The basic end-to-end services are provided without having to trust the under-

lying MTS. The message path services contribute to secure communications
throughout the MHS environment, placing requirements on functional components of all types. Transfer of EDI transactions over the MHS backbone
employs a special MHS content type. Security functions can also be provided
within the EDI content, using features in the EDI format.

The Directory is an important open-system network application which can
play a valuable role in supporting the information retrieval needs of other applications. The Directory is also significant to network security because of the
role it can play as a distributor of public key certificates for use by any network
application.

In the next chapter, we use these standards in the proposed model to
provide the security services.

Chapter 5
Direct Store Delivery System
This chapter describes the proposed model of the Direct Store Delivery System. In the model, the transactions are carried out using a trusted third party
service provider or Value Added Network Service provider. Basic functions
such as user registration, notary services, key management facilities, audit
trails and secure gateways are provided by the third party service provider.
In the proposed model, the X.500 standards were used based on the Directory
Services for resolving address issues and mutual authentication based on principal global identity. The transactions of the EDI messages are carried out
using the UN/EDIFACT standard in a message handling system environment.

5.1

The System Model

The Direct Store Delivery System [10] model is based on the concept of JIT
inventory management.

In business, JIT inventory management is gaining

widespread acceptance especially amongst retailers. It focuses on the reduction
of the inventories of the companies involved and the audit of their production.
Essentially, it optimizes supplier and customer relationships. Production and

X.500 Directory
Network Service
Provider

Ap

Individual Stores Chain
Figure 5.1: Direct Store Delivery System
inventory costs are decreased as the required level of stock is reduced.

EDI

facilitates the adoption of these J I T techniques by providing timely and accurate information which is required on a daily basis, whilst promoting the trust
and commitment required on a long term basis.

T h e Direct Store Delivery System is a chain of stores where ordering and
deliveries are carried out centrally. The chain handles the distribution to the
individual stores as shown in figure 5.1. It uses EDI to place bulk order on the
suppliers nominating the quantity needed and the expected time of delivery.
Thus, the retailers continue to get the benefit of centralized ordering and as a
consequence reduces inventory and saves on warehouse and material handling
costs. T h e merchandise can be ordered faster and a given item is never out
of stock. T h e use of Electronic Data Interchange results in error reduction in
entering data, reduces paperwork and improves cash flow thus resulting in an
efficient trading cycle.

To be able to communicate efficiently with trading partners, the X.500
standards for user friendly addressing is used. Trading can be carried out on a
global basis since the users have unique names and are identified on the basis of
principal global identity. In accordance to the X.509 Directory Authentication
Framework, the certificates contain public keys of the trading partners which
can be freely communicated in a distributed environment.

The system is modeled in an EDI Messaging System as shown in figure 5.2.
The EDI service provides a user with features to assist in communicating with
other service users. The EDIMS model comprises of an EDI User Agent, EDI
Message Store and Access Units, all of which are supported by the Message
Handling System.

The UAs in the EDIMS comprise of a specific class of

co-operating UAs. The Physical Delivery Access Unit allows EDI Users to
send messages to users outside the EDIMS who have no access to the MHS.
The EDI class of UAs create messages containing contents specific to the EDI
Messaging Service. The EDI message is conveyed in an envelope when being
transferred through the MTS. The whole transaction process can be divided
into the following independent processes.

5.1.1

Sending EDI Messages

Before the actual messages are sent, they need to be processed including the
conversion of the in-house application into a structured EDI message.

The

initiation process creates the addressing/envelope information necessary to
route the EDI message through X.400 Message Handling System. The EDI
initiator reads the messages from a file, creates the envelope information and
passes, without modification, the EDI message as the content of the mail. To
create the X.400 envelope information, the initiation process uses information

Retailer

Public Data Network

EDI Application
^^^^ EDI Application
Supplier

Supplier
EDMS UA : EDI Messaging System User Agent'
EDIMS MS : EDI Messaging System Message Store
Figurey5.2: Functional Model of Direct Store Delivery System

from the contents of the X.500 Directory entries and the contents of EDI
envelope messages. The envelope messages provide the distinguished name of
the X.500 entries that contain the envelope information. The initiator process
does not interpret any part of the actual EDI message. In theory, any EDI
content could be sent. The initiator process can also process files containing
multiple EDI messages but each message is sent in its own X.400 envelope.
Once it has built the X.400 envelope, the initiator process passes the EDI
message as X.400 mail to the service provider. More than one envelope message
can be used depending upon the transaction.

5.1.2

Routing of Messages

The service provider routes X.400 mail for the EDI through the EDI Messaging
Environment. In particular, the service provider uses the Originator/Recipient
address (i.e. the trading partner's 0 / R address), the Message Transfer Agent
and other entities in the X.500 Directory to find the route to the recipient.
These routing entries-must be configured for the EDI mail. The router also uses
entries from its local routing information to find the route and other entities
that define the receiving MTA to ensure that the routing path supports the
X.400 mail. The trusted third party also provides a mail box for receiving the
messages from the other trading partners.

5.1.3

Receipt of the EDI Message
f

The X.400 EDI messages must be received by the third party service provider
and retrieved from the mail queue identified by a command to receive the mail.
The receiver process uses an entry in the local MTA's routing information to
determine if the address is local and to find a processing queue required by the

EDI message. It then opens the X.400 envelope, provides some basic verification of the X.400 messages and saves the content of the EDI message, without
modification. Also the delivery response is sent to the originator conforming
the receipt of the message. The auditing of the whole process is done by the
third party service provider and the user is able to keep the a log of all the
transactions.

The proposed model does not offer an interactive EDI solution as the messages are delivered on a store and forward basis.

The third party service

providers provide the users with mailboxes and the transactions can be dumped
into the mailbox of a trading partner who can later retrieve it for processing.

5.2

Summary

The Direct Store Delivery System Model presents a cost effective solution for
carrying out business using EDI on a global basis. In the next chapter the
security involved in transmitting EDI messages over communications networks
and a proposal to enhance the security in these systems is discussed.

Chapter 6
Security in EDIFACT
This chapter describes the UN/EDIFACT standards for structuring EDI messages. It discusses the security in the existing EDIFACT standard with the
proposal to enhance the security in EDIFACT standards by incorporating certificates, digital signatures and security purposes in the messages itself.

6.1

Basic Concepts

In chapter 2, EDI has been defined as the application-to-application exchange
of electronic data across organizational boundaries, in such a way that no human intervention or interpretation is required. The development of standards
is a crucial factor in the EDI systems. The EDI standards provide the structure
required for computers or, more specifically, applications running on computers to be able to read and process electronic data. For example, supermarket
items come from different suppliers either directly or through wholesalers. The
supermarket issues purchasing orders daily, which are sorted and distributed
to its suppliers. The supermarket does all the trading through EDI for quicker
delivery and overall accuracy in ordering. To carry out transactions smoothly

between various suppliers, they should have an agreed standard to format the
data and exchange other forms of information like invoice, payment orders etc.
Since there is no human intervention in EDI, it becomes necessary to develop
an internationally standard in EDI to satisfy the needs of the large customers
and the suppliers scattered globally. There are various standards developed to
cope up with this problem of incompatibility, e.g. ANSI X12, UN/EDIFACT,
O D E T T E etc. The UN/EDIFACT standard has been accepted by the ISO as
the universal standard for all document translation activities world-wide.

6.2

EDIFACT Standard

The UN/EDIFACT standard [36, 41]specifies syntax rules for EDI for administration, commerce, and transport to structure the EDI messages.

The document structures used in the standards have generally been unified, introducing principles and rules for their specification. Moreover, every
document is suggested in the standard in terms of its structure and the properties of the structural components. In this way, these standards should cover
all situations emerging in practice.

The EDIFACT syntax [41] defines the elements used to structure exchanges
of data as shown in figure 6.1. It consists of one or more Messages, each related to a particular transaction, grouped together in an Interchange.

The

f.

Interchange is an outermost envelope, and contains information about the
sender and recipient (addressing) in the header, and about the total number
of Messages in an Interchange in the trailer. This structure is just like having
records in a data file.
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Messages themselves are formed from Segments^ which in turn are built
from Data Elements. The Data elements are identified by their position in the
Segment, as indicated by the number of Data elements separators, and can
be of variable length. Segments are identified by three characters (the tag) at
the beginning and have their own Segment separators. They can also repeat.
Their use may be either mandatory or conditional depending" on the transaction taking place or the data to be conveyed, e.g. financial transactions,
invoices, purchase order etc.

The message is the innermost envelope, and has a header which specifies
the type of message (e.g. payment order, invoice) and a trailer which counts
the number of segments in the message. The Interchange and the Message
headers and trailers are also Segments. Since their three latter tag starts with
the letter U, they are known as Service Segments, which are held in the Syntax
Directory, rather than the User Directory, which contain Message

Segments.

Thus, qualitative and quantitative information is contained in separate
fields. Besides their value, they are assigned some meaning and properties,
for example data format attributes. Different levels of nesting of the segment
groups and segments are allowed to make parts of a document dependent on
hierarchically higher segment levels.

6.3

Security in EDIFACT

The EDIFACT security documents [37, 38, 39] defines practical implementation of various EDIFACT security services within the message themselves. The

features offered by the standards include the following:
• independence of and transparent to the communication medium used;
• an open standard which supports all existing security mechanisms;
• the employment of security mechanisms such as confidentiality, authentication, integrity, non-repudiation etc. at application level;
• security services to be implemented by trading partners themselves, end
to end and transparent to the underlying communication protocols, which
may themselves provide security services;
• without making changes to individual messages. A global approach is
adopted which can be applied to any message irrespective of the business
application.
The basic security services used to protect an EDI message are:

M e s s a g e Content Integrity
Message Content Integrity guarantees detection of unauthorized data modification of a message. It is achieved by sending with the message an integrity
control value. This value is computed by using the asymmetric algorithms.
The receiver of the message computes the integrity control value of the data
actually received, using the corresponding algorithm and parameters and then
compares the result with the value received.
f.

M e s s a g e Sequence Integrity
Message Sequence Integrity prevents duplication, addition, deletion, loss or
replay of messages. It is guaranteed with a message sequence number or a

timestamp added to the message. In order to give full protection, the integrity
of a sequence number or a timestamp must be guaranteed.

Message Origin Authentication
Message Origin Authentication protects against the actual sender of the message claiming to be some other authorized entity. It authenticates the origin
of data and gives to the recipient the proof that the source of data received is
as claimed. Message origin authentication is achieved by sending the digital
signature along with the message.

6.3.1

Message Level Security

Security is incorporated in the individual messages. In EDIFACT standard,
specific groups of security segments for message level protection are introduced.
These security services are interpreted in the messages with the help of security
headers and trailers. These segments can be used with any EDIFACT message.
They are placed just after the message header and before the message trailer
segments (UNH and UNT). The headers and trailers are actually a group of
segments and can repeat, depending on the security needed, in any particular
transaction. The overall structure of the security header and trailer is as shown
in figure 6.2.

The security message header and trailer are reported for all the security services applied tb protect the message. For example, a message may be secured
by several entities and so the security related information may be repeated
to allow the identification of several signing or authentication entities and
correspondingly to include several digital signatures or control values. This
approach allows maximum flexibility.
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Figure 6.3: EDIFACT Message Using the Digital Signature
The following procedure [46] outlines the use of public key cryptoalgorithm
to ensure the origin authentication as shown in figure 6.4
• The sender server creates the digital signature of the message m to be
transmitted.
s=hash(7n)
• The sending party signs the message digest (the digital signature) s using
its private key K^ : s = EKI(S)
• The sender transmits (m, 5)
• The resolver decrypts 5 by using sender's public key K^ = s = DKC(s)

• the resolver recomputes the message digest s = hash(m)

• if {s=s) then the resolver has validated the integrity and the originator
of the message.
The run time for the public key cryptoalgorithm is quite high. Many CPU
cycles are needed. Hence, we take the fixed size of the output of the algorithm
i.e. the hashed contents of the message. A strong hash function should have
the following properties:
• The hash function must be one-way i.e. given any possible hash result it
must be computationally infeasible to construct an input message which
hashes to this result (examples are the MD2, MD4, MD5 and HAVAL
algorithms)
• the signature (message digest) produces a fixed length output.
• the hash function must be collision-free, i.e. it must be computationally
infeasible to construct two distinct input messages which hash to the
same result.
For example, a digital signature or MAC is introduced in the security message itself without changing the syntax of the EDI message. In the figure 6.3,
the digital signature is added to provide authentication of origin. In detail,
the security header contains:
1. The type of security function provided, e.g. authentication, integrity.
2. Whether security acknowledgment is required.
3. The character set used to represented the printed characters when the
result was calculated, e.g. ASCII, EBCDIC.
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Figure 6.4: Digital Signature Generation and Validation
4. The roles of the security provider, e.g. issuing the message, witnessing
their message.
5. Identification of security sender and recipient, e.g. who signed the message.
6. A sequence number and/or a timestamp.
7. The algorithms used to calculate the security result, e.g. RSA [1], MD5,
DES.
8. A number to link the header to the corresponding trailer.
The security trailer contains:
1. The security result, e.g. MAC or digital signature.
2. A number to link the trailer to the corresponding header

6.3.2 Security Data Elements
The UN/EDDFACT security recommendations employ a considerable number of
optional segments and data elements. In addition to that, some data elements
have large field length definitions. This allows for the accommodation of all
known security techniques and also possible evolutions thus providing the user
with maximum flexibility in implementing the security mechanisms. However,
once the user selects the appropriate security services to use, only a small subset
of segments and data elements will be utilized and the actual size of the data
elements would be shorter. The most important segments in the data elements are
SEC
Security service is actually provided, e.g. authentication of origin, message
content integrity etc.
ALG
Identification techniques and algorithms used.
CER
Technical parameter required, e.g. certificates, key identification, user name etc.
RST
Security results e.g. MAC, integrity value, digital signature etc.
The approval of using the security segments for the message security level does
not require syntax changes to the EDBFACT messages. The solution consists in
the definition of the EDCFACT rule that states the acceptance of two approved
forms of each existin«^ EDEFACT message : one with security and one without

security. If the message must be secure then the security features must be in
accordance to the recommendations of EDIFACT.
The two security services, not addressed by this structure, are the nonrepudiation and the confidentiality of the messages.
Non-repudiation of messages require the recipient to issue and acknowledgment
message which is signed by them. This special service is known as AUTACK
(Authentication and Acknowledgment). It contains the same segment as in the
EDIFACT standard to allow the recipient to sign the message, whilst the message
itself contains unique references to the messages of the sender. This unique
reference is usually composed of the message number (from the message header)
and the security result (from the message trailer). Many original messages can be
acknowledged by a single AUTACK. The AUTACK message has a second
purpose. If the message is originally sent without security, it can subsequently
carry a signature or a MAC for that message and the calculated hash value of the
message. It is used sometimes where bulk data is sent, then the transactions are
authorized and authenticated afterwards. It also provides a means of signing the
whole interchange,until the security of the interchange level is used in the syntax.
Confidentiality is addressed by the introduction of a new message. The reason is
that if all the data between the message header and the trailer is simply encrypted
(and filtered to produce only the valid syntax as defined in EDIFACT), then the
count on the number of the segments in the message trailer no longer matches the
number of segment separators in die message. This may confuse some networks

and translators. For this reason, the whole of the original message, including
all the headers and the trailers, is encrypted and filtered, and the result is put
into a string of 350 byte free text segments. The security header is added, to
describe the security originator and recipient, the encryption algorithm, filter
function used and possibly the message encryption keys protected by public
key techniques. When security is incorporated in the EDIFACT syntax, it is
possible to introduce this header information to the normal message security
header and also to the message to be encrypted.

6.4

Summary

In the Direct Store Delivery System, it is possible to incorporate EDIFACT
message structures with enhanced security functions [38]. The secure EDIFACT message will include the following functions:
• Generation and storage of asymmetric cryptographic keys (in the form
of X.509 certificates).
• Distribution of certificates from the administrator's station where certificates are generated to EDI servers( by ftp protocol)
• Generation and handling of symmetric cryptographic keys for encryption
and integrity of EDI messages.
• encryption and integrity of outgoing messages, together with signing of
the symmetric keys and
• verification of the signature of the symmetric key on receipt, decryption
of the message and their integrity verification.

In the next chapter, the security hi the communications networks is discussed.
The issues of authentication, non-repudiation, integrity and confidentiality will
be addressed.

Chapter 7
Security Services
This chapter describes the security services provided by the proposed model
in an EDI environment. The model primarily provides security functions like
mutual authentication based on X.500 standards, user identification, non repudiation of origin and receipt for transferring EDI messages.

7.1

E D I Security Implementation

Security of a distributed system is a topic of growing importance. The security
breaches of the last few years (internet worm) have demonstrated the need to
have strong security policies and techniques to ensure reliable communication.
The goal of any system is to carry transactions in an open and secure fashion
either on a point-to-point basis or on a public data network.

The crucial

question that needs to be addressed before implementing the security services,
is their placement at appropriate level in the ISO/OSI reference model. Given
the nature of the type of security processing to be performed (e.g. integrity
checking), it is essential that the security mechanisms be invoked while the
entire EDI information segments is still intact. The reasons for locating the

security services in the model at the application level are:
• they satisfy security requirements which are inherently meaningful only
to a particular application, e.g.

access control to application-internal

resources, or non-repudiation;
• protect selected fields within application protocols, e.g. the PIN in a
financial transaction;
• protect information conveyed through multiple end systems in distributed
applications, e.g. application level store-and-forward; and
• provide end-system level protection, without forcing an application to
depend on a particular underlying protocol (e.g. the OSI transport or
network protocol).

7.2

Assumptions

The security services are based on the X.400 and X.500 standards. In providing
the security services in the model of the Direct Store Delivery System, it is
assumed that the Directory is free from tampering and the certificates obtained
from the Directory are unforgeable. The following assumptions are made in
the X.500 standards for the secure exchange of certificates:
• A secure bind from the Directory User Agent (DUA) to a Directory
Service Agent (DSA); this is a secured Directory Access Protocol (DAP).
• If two DSAs are to communicate with each other, they may do so by a
secured access between them of the Directory Systems Protocol (DSP).
If the DUA requests information which is not on the DSA to which
it is bound, that DSA may request the information from other DSAs

by secured DSP enquiries; the data will not be returned to the DUA
(referral); the DUA may then make a strong bind to the referred DSA
with DSP.

7.3

Computer Security Planning for EDI

The network service provider should provide the protocol conversion and mail
box facility for storing messages of the various trading partners. In addition,
the basic security services and audit trails should be kept by the trusted third
party [32 .

7.3.1

Risk Based Implementation

In the development of computer security plans for EDI, agencies should allocate
resources according to the risk and magnitude of potential harm resulting from
the loss, misuse, or unauthorized access to or modification of the information
contained or transmitted by the EDI system. In EDI, certain types of messages
may be more inherently sensitive than others. There must be assurance that
each price quotation or purchase order is accurate and has been sent from
the named originator.

Less care would need to be taken with invoice sent

to an agency, if the agency's internal control system is sufficiently robust to
automatically reject all non-authentic invoices.

7.3.2

Maintenance of Electronic Records

EDI messages that are transmitted must be included in the system of electronic records. It must be ensured that : - the records of EDI interchanges are
complete; unauthorized modification or alterations to records are prevented;

all modifications or alterations are automatically recorded in an electronic audit trail and dates and times of relevant activities are recorded and are correct
and precise.

7.3.3

Audit Trail for Message Authorization

With the paper documents that are sent to the recipient, the handwritten
signature of an authorizing officer is usually used to obligate the originator;
a notation that the original was signed is often seen on a retained copy. An
equivalent must be provided for each EDI message used as a replacement. An
electronic copy of each transmitted EDI message, together with the proof of
approval, should be retained for audit purposes.

7.4
7.4.1

Security Services
User Identification

To use the EDI system services, the user has first to identify his credentials to
the server. Once the credentials are established, the user can use the services
to either query the database or carry out other transactions. There are two
practical approaches in the user identification.

In the first approach, the user, after entering the name, is prompted for a
password which consists of the user's name, a one-way hash of the password,
a timestamp and a nonce which is returned to the user to be used . To prevent the hash of the password and the nonce from being intercepted over the
network, they are encrypted using the public key of the CA. If the one way
hash of the password from the database matches with that of the user, the CA

returns the nonce encrypted with the public key of the originator.

The second approach is used in retail stores which use a standalone PC
for communicating EDI messages. To identify the individuals responsible for
signing the transactions, a personal token such as smart cards [47] can be used
for user identification. Smart cards are unforgeable and provide reliable means
of identification.

7.4.2

Authentication

Authentication is used to:
• verify the identity of the sender of a message to the receiver in order to
detect spoofing or impersonation.
• verify the integrity of the message by detecting changes (modifications)
in a message introduced between the sending and receiving process.
• protect a unique message identifier used to detect attempts at insertion,
deletion or replay of messages.
Most of the above threats can be countered by using strong authentication.
In this, neither the entity which is authenticated nor any eavesdropper on the
conversation can furnish the ability to impersonate the authenticating principal. There are some interception attacks which cannot be countered by strong
authentication only. Hence, additional data encryption is needed to secure the
channel. The well known cryptosystems are RSA using public key techniques
and DES, LOKI using symmetric key techniques. RSA is a widely preferred
algorithm for digital signatures as well as for authentication with secrecy.

The message-origin authentication service is provided by the existence of
the message token containing the signature which uniquely identifies the origin
of the message. To achieve this, the content integritij check is included in the
signed data part of the token.

The receiver obtains the trusted copy of the public key from the Certification Authority of the sender. If the CAs of the sender and receiver are
different then the receiver uses the certification path that has been supplied as
a part of the originator's certificate, to determine the copy of the receiver CA's
public key. Using this the receiver validates the signature on the originator's
certificate.

7.4.3

Authentication Protocol

T h e X.509 Directory Authentication framework is defined in the standards.
This protocol is a slight modification of the standard mutual protocol [15] due
to the security defects mentioned in the existing X.509 protocol [27, 30, 45 .
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In the second step, the CA sends A, the certificates of both A and B. In
order to sign data, the user applies a one-way hash function to the data followed by the digital signature D. Timestamps are needed to guard against the
replay attack [3]. An intruder is not able to replace the messages in the above
steps since he does not have the secret key of the CA. In the third step, A
generates a nonce RA, which is used to detect replay attacks and to prevent
forgery. Additionally A can send some plaintext data datal which he signs to
preserve the integrity and some secret data datal- On receiving the message
from A, B verifies the certificate, checks that B itself is the intended recipient,
timestamp is current and optionally checks whether RA has not been replayed.

B then generates a nonce RB for similar purposes to RA- Additionally B can
also send some plaintext data data] and secret data datal.

A checks that A is

the intended recipient, RA is identical to the one which was sent by A and the
RB is not been replayed. It responds to B by sending the nonce RB along with
the B. On reception, B checks the signature and thus the integrity of the signed
information and also checks that RB is identical to the one which was sent by B.

In this way, at the end of the protocol, both the users are convinced that
they are communicating with the right person.

The above authentication

process safeguards the integrity as well as confidentiality of the message. T h e
users can then generate a session key which is used to encrypt the subsequent
traffic on the association.

7.4.4

Non-Repudiation

Non-repudiation of origin protects the recipient from the sender's denial of
having ever sent the message. Protection can be achieved by the sender including the digital signature with the message and the receiver sending the
acknowledgment which contains the digital signature.
T h e non-repudiation of delivery does not necessarily imply t h a t the recipient read the data or acted upon it in any way. The recipient can acknowledge
the receipt by generating an acknowledgment message back to the originator,
with the message containing the digital signature computed on a copy or a
digest of the eontents of the original delivered data item. Figure 7.1 shows
the operation where the recipient's digital signature is used. T h e sender of
the message requests this service from the receiver by by including a proof of
delivery request flag as a part of the signed data in the message token to the
receiver. T h e proof of delivery is computed as a signature on the unencrypted
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Figure 7.1: Non-Repudiation of Delivery
message content and the various other parameters. The receiver then returns
the proof of delivery together with his certificate to the sender of the message.

7,4.5

Responsibility

A new feature in EDI MS is the EDI responsibihty notification. The purpose
of introducing the concept of EDIMS Responsibility is primarily to provide
a method for confirming the passing of messages amongst UAs. In EDIMS a
user or user application can request a notification of responsibility of a message
by a recipient or a recipient application. This notification is requested by an
originating UA and is generated by a recipient UA taking the responsibility
for the message. Responsibility implies that a message received is either available to the EDIMS user or that it is forwarded with changes. One notification
serves to carry both the positive response above and a negative response. The
negative response means that the message referred to will not be processed by
an EDI application. It is possible to forward a received message unchanged

and pass the obligation to respond to the responsibility notification request to
the forward recipient, or intermediate recipients who then must respond to the
originator of the message.

The Responsibility field is represented as :

ResponsibilityForwarded ::= BOOLEAN

(Default FALSE)

If this field is TRUE it indicates to the receiving UA that Responsibility was
forwarded. If this value is FALSE (or absent), it indicates to the receiving UA
that the security elements of the inner envelope have been checked.

7.4.6

Key Management

Regardless of the type of cryptosystem used, either symmetric or asymmetric,
it is necessary for the communicating parties to obtain each others keys. In the
proposed model, the X.500 Directory services were used for the distribution of
certificates which contain the public key of the trading partners. The advantage of using the Directory services is that the keys can be freely distributed
in a networked environment.

7.4.7

Message Loss

Vulnerability to message loss is considered critical to an EDI application. The
types of message loss can be distinguished as:
• failure of the UA or MS
• loss of individual message due to security violations

As a result, the transfer of messages between responsibility domains requires
protection for service providers in addition to that of end users.

7.5

Summary

This chapter described the security services which are incorporated in the
proposed model. The service, like authentication on a global basis, is realised
with the use of X.500 standards. Also, the non-repudiation services, which are
very important due to lack of a hard copy, can be effectively implemented by
the use of digital signatures.

Chapter 8
Conclusions and Further Work
In this thesis, a model of the Direct Store Delivery System was proposed which
can be implemented in a cost effective manner without compromising the security of the Electronic Data Interchange Systems. The security provided in
the existing EDI systems were studied and a proposal was made to enhance
the security in the present day EDI system which incorporated the enhanced
security services like mutual authentication, non-repudiation, responsibility,
user identification etc.

The whole EDI transaction was divided into two distinct categories:
• The conversion of the in-house application into an EDI format with
the use of translation software. The security features provided in the
UN/EDIFACT standard for structuring EDI messages are enhanced with
the inclusion of the certificates and digital signature, without changing
the syntax of the EDI format. Single or multiple messages level security
can be incorporated in the model. Thus the security provided will depend on whether a financial transaction or any general EDI transaction
is taking place.

• After the conversion into a standardized EDI format, the EDI messages
needs to be communicated over a communications network. The inherent
security problems in the network makes it necessary to have security
while the data is in transit. Also in a distributed networked environment,
reliable authentication between the communicating parties is necessary.
In this model global authentication was provided by the use of X.509
Directory Authentication framework and the whole transaction can be
carried out in a message handling system.
The third party service providers are responsible for the basic services of
keeping the log of transactions, audit and other control functions. Also, they
can act as a Certification Authority to keep the database of user information
which can be freely communicated on a network.

As a result of the security enhancements, the problems occurring in the
the EDI systems like cross vulnerability, password guessing attacks, authentications can be countered efficiently. In general, the following features are
provided:
• The Direct Store Delivery System is a straight forward model which provides a high degree of security in a cost effective manner.
• It relieves the user from the burden of maintenance, upgradation of the
system and expansion to other networks.
• If the third party service providers have the provision of Directory services and messaging handling systems, then the electronic transactions
can be carried out globally with a reasonable degree of security.
• Once the user authentication is complete, all the security features of the
model will be transparent to the user.

• In the model, we make no assumptions about the security of the underlying network. The data is transmitted in an encrypted form to ensure
that even the third party cannot extract message enroute.

8.1

Further Work

The next step is to implement the Direct Store Delivery System by providing
a Graphical User Interface (GUI) tool. In the current application, the model
cannot be used in an interactive mode but this is not a major limitation. Secondly, the RSA public key cryptosystem is used for exchange of certificates
and public keys. The RSA cryptosystem is slower than the conventional cryptosystems, but as the application is not interactive, the computational time
delay is not noticed by the user.

The security features should protect all types of data. Future EDIs must
be able to deal not only with standard business data but also with related data
such as electrical and mechanical characteristics ( C A D / C A M and test data).
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Appendix A
Security Enhanced Direct Store
Delivery System
Abstract
Currently there is limited security provided in carrying out business using Electronic Data Interchange (EDI). The aim of this paper is to enhance the security of the Direct Store Delivery System which is a special form of EDI. The
whole communication process is carried out using a trusted third party service
provider with a view to maximize the performance of the system.
describes authenticity using X.500 recommendations,

The model

confidentiality and in-

tegrity using public key cryptography and provides a low cost solution to the
existing system.

The transactions are carried out in the UN/EDIFACT

format

using the X.435 standards.

A.l

Introduction

The primary purpose of EDI is to provide communication standards that promote the interchange of common business information to facilitate the elec-

tronic linkages without human intervention. In recent years, both public and
private sectors use EDI for trading purposes. The increasing use of EDI in
financial transactions has made it necessary to consider network security in
greater detail and enhance the security in these systems. The following issues
need to be raised in view of security of the existing EDI systems [13 .
• There is limited security in most of the present day EDI systems. They
rely on passwords to access the system thus making it vulnerable to
password guessing attacks.
• As more and more business information is transmitted between computer
systems, we need to protect these transactions from unauthorized viewing
and/or alteration. Unauthorized viewing can provide competitive information which may be undesirable to disclose. With the introduction of
third parties and increased risk of unauthorized access to confidential
information, there is a need to restructure the existing security features.
• Generally, EDI systems work on a point to point basis or have a limited
number of trading partners. The security and control features incorporated in the system are as strong as the weakest link in the EDI chain.
A cross-vulnerability resulting from technical limitation can compromise
the integrity of the dependent EDI systems.
• Different security standards may create problems when trading partners
are adhering to different standards.
• The security features needs to be upgraded as the complexity grows.
This paper describes security enhancement of the Direct Store Delivery
System which uses a Trusted Third Party Service Provider or Value Added
Network (VAN) over a network as shown in figure 1 with a view to maximize

the performance of the system. It provides a low cost security solution to the
existing EDI applications. We used X.500 standards based on the Directory
Services for resolving the address issues and mutual authentication based on
the principal global identity [15]. The whole transaction in the model was
carried out using the UN/EDIFACT format of transactions.
Section 2 provides the background on the concepts used in the model,
section 3 describes the Direct Store Delivery System model and the security
features provided and section 4 summarizes the paper with the gains in implementing the model and scope for further work.

A.2

Concepts and Mechanisms

The primary goal of any system is to carry out transactions in an open and
secure fashion either on a point to point basis or on a public data network.
However, in networked and distributed environments, what particular users
are allowed to do depends upon the security policies in effect. Within a single
domain, where all processing nodes and network links are under the control
of the same administration, security is not such a critical issue.

However,

when the transaction takes place between two separate domains and makes
use of public data networks, security issues must be considered in great detail. A trusted third party network provider provides some security functions
like trusted key issuers, key-management facihties, user registration, notary
services and security gateways.

A.2.1

Security Issues

The following are some of the network security issues which need to be considered for secure communication.

Supplier

X.500 Directory

Ap

Individual Stores Chain

Figure A.l: Direct Store Delivery System
• Authentication
Authentication is a process used to:
- verify the identity of the sender of a message to the receiver in order
to detect spoofing or impersonation.
- verify the integrity of the message by detecting changes (modifications) in a message introduced between the sending and receiving
process.
- protect a unique message identifier used to detect attempts at insertion, deletion or replay of messages.
Most of the above threats can be countered by using strong authentication. In this, neither the entity which is authenticated nor any eavesdropper on the conversation can furnish the ability to impersonate the
authenticating principal. There are some interception attacks which cannot be countered by strong authentication only. Hence, additional data

encryption is needed to secure the channel. The well known cryptosystems are RSA [1] using public key techniques and DES, LOKI using
symmetric key techniques. RSA is widely preferred algorithm for digital
signatures as well as for authentication with secrecy.
• Key Distribution and Management
Secure methods of key management are extremely important. In practice, most attacks on the public key systems are probably aimed at the
key management levels, rather than at the cryptographic algorithm itself. Users must obtain a key pair securely and efficiently suited to their
security needs. In compliance with the CCITT X.500 standards the directories contain certificates as well as the public keys. Certificates are
unforgeable. Hence it is difficult to impersonate another user.
• Non-Repudiation of Origin and Receipt
Non-repudiation of origin protects the recipient from the sender's denial
of having ever sent the message, while non-repudiation of receipt protects
the sender of the message from the receiver's denial of having received the
message. Protection can be achieved by the sender including the digital
signature with the message and the receiver sending the acknowledgment
which contains the digital signature.

In the protocol, the identity of -

the user is bound with the public key by digital signature by issuing
certificates. The proof of delivery is done by the appropriate User Agent
when it deceives the message.
• Security Elements in EDI Messaging Structure
The word envelope is used to represent different headers and trailers
structured to form the EDI message as shown in figure 2. The UN/EDIFACT

r

Interchange Envelope Header(UNB)
Functional Group Envelope
Header(UNG)
Message Header(UNH)
^ Security Header(SEC)

_ Security Trailer(RST)
Message Trailer(RST)

Functional Envelop Trailer(UNE)
Interchange Envelop Trailer(UNZ)
Figure A.2: UN/EDIFACT message format

standard provides the following features:
- the employment of established security mechanisms
- security services to be implemented by trading partners themselves,
end to end and transparent to the underlying communication protocols, which may themselves provide security services
- independence of and transparent to the communication medium
used
- an open standard which supports all existing security mechanisms
- not involving changes to individual messages. A global approach
is adopted which can be applied to any message irrespective of the
business application.
All security functions except the non-repudiation of receipt are provided
by the inclusion of generic security header and trailer segments after the
message header (UNH) and before the message trailer(UNT). If required
a financial transactions can use more than one security envelopes.
• Responsibility
Another important feature that is incorporated is the responsibility for
messages at each stage of the message path through the Message Handling System environment [16]. Since a Trusted Third Party is used, the
transfer of responsibihty is to be clearly identified and assured of further
protectioji not only to the end users but also to the service provider. In
the X.435 standard, the Responsibility Forwarded field is used to indicate whether Responsibility was forwarded or not. When responsibility
is accepted, the security elements are checked.
• User Authorization and Access Control

Authorization is an identity based access control for authorizing a particular user to carry out transactions. A simple way of doing this is to send
the distinguished name and the password. The Directory will confirm
whether the credentials are valid or not. The user is then notified accordingly. The proper functioning of the logical access control assists in
preventing and detecting (by reporting security violations and attempts
to access) unauthorized access to data.

A.2.2

The Directory

The Directory Services are required to support the security services within the
message handling system and provide a name server. Typically, the MHS may
access the Directory to determine the credentials of a user for the authentication process, identify the intended receiver and to resolve the address issues.
The two basic entities of the Directory Service are the Directory User Agent
and the Directory Service Agent.
Each user's public key is stored in the Directory. A user wishing to have a
secure exchange of messages with another user, obtains the other user's public
key by using the Directory Services. He then uses this key within the required
security service. The directory should be secured against tampering. Users are
allowed to view and query the database and only the Certification Authority
is allowed to modify an entry in the directory.
The security services can be provided by different layers and different protocols dependi-tig on the application requirements. The approach is based on
the following functions:
• identification of the vulnerabilities of the system
• definition of security services

• placement of the security services in the particular protocol.

A.3

The System Model

The Direct Store Delivery System [10] is a chain of stores where ordering and
deliveries are carried out centrally and the chain handles the distribution to
the individual stores. It uses EDI to place bulk order with the suppliers telling
them how much to deliver and when. Thus the retailers continue to get the
benefit of centralized ordering and like the use of Just-In-Time stock management techniques, reduces inventory and saves on warehouse and material
handling costs. The merchandise can be ordered faster and a given item is
never out of stock. At the same time there is increased vulnerability to illegal
access with the use of public data network and a trusted third party.
The system consists of User Agent and Message Store in the messaging
environment modeled as a functional object as shown in figure 3. The whole
transaction process can be divided into independent processes:
• Service Initiation —Initiation process starts with the retailer logging
into the network through the access units User Agents.
• Verification of Public key of the trading partner — T h e user can verify
the public key of the trading partner from the database query and get
the appropriate certificate from the directory database.
• Generation of the Session key for transactions

Once the authentication

of the trading partners has taken place then they can generate a session
key to encrypt the subsequent traffic on the association.
• Trading : After completing all the above processes, the user can carry
out transactions.

The transaction generated is dumped into the mail

Retailer
Application
Public Data Network

DSA

Global
Distributed
Diiectory

Centialised
Diiectoiy

Application
Supplier
Figure-'A.3: Functional Model of Direct Store Delivery System

box of the supplier who processes it and sends an appropriate response
to the request. The auditing of the whole process is done by the third
party and the user keeps a copy of the log of the transactions.
The security requirements are related to the user's perceived threats and his assessment of the cost of the security breach. Keeping this in view, the following
generic security services are added to the Direct Store Delivery System.

A.3.1

Basic Security Services

The message consists of two parts, namely an Envelope and a Content. The Envelope contains the necessary information for routing and delivering purposes
and the Content contains the actual information which is to be transferred.

User Authorization
For using the services the user has first to identify his credentials to the server.
Once the credentials are established, the user can use the services to either
query the database or carry out other transactions. The user, after entering
the name, is prompted for a password which consists of the user's name, a
one-way hash of the password, a timestamp and a nonce which is returned to
the user to be used. To prevent the hash of the password and the nonce from
being intercepted over the network, they are encrypted using the public key of
the CA. If the one way hash of the password from the database matches with
that of the user, the CA returns the nonce encrypted with the public key of
the originator.

Key Management
The RSA public key system is used to exchange the DES keys. The public key
of the receiving User Agent is used to encrypt the DES key employed in the

message encryption. The sending User Agent transfers this encrypted DES
key to the receiving UA. The X.509 Directory Authentication framework is
used for the authentication of the public keys of the users.

Authentication Protocol
As discussed earlier, the provision of the three services : Message Origin Authentication, Content Integrity and Non-Repudiation of Origin are grouped
together.
The message-origin-authentication service is provided by the existence of
message token which contains a signature which uniquely identifies the origin
of the message.

However, this does not guarantee that there has been no

modification of the message. To achieve this, the content integrity check is
included in the signed data part of the token.
The receiver obtains the trusted copy of the pubhc key from the CA of the
sender. If the CAs of the sender and the receiver are different, the receiver
uses the certification path that has been supphed as part of the originator's
certificate, to determine the copy of the receiver CA's public key. Using this,
the receiver validates the signature on the originator's certificate.
The Protocol
The protocol is a slight modification of the existing X.509 Directory mutual
authentication protocol [6 .
step 1
The exchange between the two parties A and B with A sending message to the
Authentication Server AS ( in this application the Third Party) to find the
public key of B [2]. This is done by looking into the database of the Directory.

A

A5 : A.B
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Step 2,

AS
where D^ =

A: D1.D2

A.kl.h.t2)

are timestamps, ¿2,4 are the lifetime of the corresponding keys and . indicates concatenation. In order to sign data, the user applies a one-way hash
function to the data followed by his digital signature (private transformation)
D. The timestamps are needed to guard against the replay attack [3]. An intruder is not able to replace the messages in the previous steps since he does
not have the secret key of the AS.
Step 3.
A^

B :

Di.RA.B.datal.E{kl,datal).D{kl,

h{RA.B.datalE{kl,datal)))
where R^ is nonce chosen by A, /i is strong one way hash function, data\ is
the plaintext data which they sign to preserve the integrity and data?^ is the
secret data to be exchanged between the two principals A and B.
step 4B ^ A:

RB-A.RA.datalE{kP,datal).

D{kl.h{RB.A.RA.datal.E(kl,datal)))
where Rb is nonce generated by B, data] is the plaintext data and datal is the
secret data to be exchanged.
step 5.
A^B-.RB.D[kl.h{RB.B))
Thus at the end of the protocol, both the users are convinced that they are
communicating with the right person. The above authentication process safeguards the integrity as well as confidentiality of the message. The users can

then generate a session key which is used to encrypt the subsequent traffic on
the association.

Non-Repudiation of Delivery
The sender of tiie message requests this service from the receiver by including
a proof-of-delivery-request flag as a part of the signed-data in the message
token to the receiver. The proof-of-delivery is computed as a signature on the
unencrypted mess age-content and the various other parameters. The receiver
then returns the proof-of-delivery, together with his certificate, to the sender
of the message.

Access Control Mechanisms
In this paper we will consider the access control between a User Agent and its
corresponding Message Store. This is achieved by using another type of token
called a bind-token which is exchanged between the UA and the MS at the
time of connection initiation. The token includes information as signed data
and time which is checked by the MS to determine if it is valid. The token
signature is computed using the UA's secret RSA key. The MS then returns
the token to the UA which makes further checks and if all these checks are
satisfied, then the connection can be estabhshed. The token from the MS to
the UA is signed which implies that the MS needs to have its own RSA pair
9, 17 .

Message Loss
Vulnerability to the message loss is considered critical to the EDI application.
The types of message loss can be distinguished as :
• failure of the UA or MS

• loss of individual message due to security violations.
So the transfer of messages between responsibility domains requires protection
for service providers in addition to that of end users.

A. 4

Summary

This paper specifies a model for a secure direct store delivery system. It is
straightforward model which provides a high degree of security in a cost effective manner and has many desirable features. Particularly, if the third party
provides the directory services, then electronic transactions can be carried out
with a reasonable degree of security over the network. It relieves the user from
burden of maintenance, upgradation of the system and expansion to other
networks. Furthermore, once the user authentication is complete, all security
features of the direct store delivery system will be transparent to the user.
The system makes no assumptions about the reliability of the underlying
network. The data is transmitted in an encrypted form to ensure that even
a third party cannot extract any information enroute. For this appropriate
end-to-end encryption must be provided to counter traffic analysis.
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